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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The alleviation of poverty is one of the most debated issues among the 
academicians and policy makers.  From 1950s to 1980s the poverty reduction program 
has been based on increase the participation of poor into the economy by better 
macroeconomic performance. Though the poor part of population mostly engaged in 
informal sector
1
 is identified by researchers but has not become the part of economic 
models and government policy [Robinson (2001)].  Poverty reduction has been 
institutionalised in 1944 when World Bank was set up. The World Bank worked through 
governments and institutions by giving loans to developing countries called structural-
adjustment programmes. These programmes were highly unsuccessful, created 
dependence on aid with little help to poor part of societies [Murduch (1999) and Diop, et 
al. (2007)].  
This failure due to distrust in formal institutions give the beginning of a shift in 
development thinking that leads to the emergence of microfinance. The focus is support 
of the informal sector by providing credit to help people to pull them above the poverty 
line. Microfinance helps these informal micro-enterprises through micro-credit. The 
micro-credit approach to poverty reduction is “the provision of small loans to individuals, 
usually within groups, as capital investment to enable income generation through self-
employment” [Weber (2006)]. The informal businesses of poor are referred as a type of 
un-met demand for credit. Poverty is considered as the outcome of market failure,
2
 
microfinance would correct the market failure, providing access to credit to the poor. 
Credit would create economic power that would generate into social power, lifting the 
poor out of poverty [Yunus (1999)].  
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1Until 1980s the presence of in-formal microenterprises- street vendors, home workshops, market stalls, 
providers of informal transportation services-are generally considered by policy-makers and economists to be a 
result of economic dysfunction [Robinson (2001)]. 
2Market imperfections, asymmetric information and the high fixed costs of small-scale lending, 
decrease to reach of the poor to formal finance, thus the poor will chose the informal financial sector or to the 
worst case of financially excluded [Green, Kirkpatrick, and Murinde (2006)]. 
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Thereafter, microfinance is considered as an important tool for reducing poverty.
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These developments have generated high expectations from the microfinance programs to 
alleviate poverty effects among donors and policy makers and aid organisations. 
However, latter it is recognised that microfinance programmes can play long term and 
significant role to reduce poverty, MFIs need to be successful in extending loans to poor 
borrowers, while at the same time being able to at least cover the costs of their lending 
activities, i.e., they may need to focus on being financial sustainable in the long run” 
[Armendariz and Labie (2011)]. 
MFIs are facing a double challenge in reducing poverty: they have to provide both 
financial services to the poor (outreach) and also cover their costs in order to avoid 
bankruptcy (sustainability). This is the main motivation to assess MFIs’ both dimensions 
to deal poverty that are taken into account in the present paper. 
The present study tries to answer this question by analysing whether microfinance 
institutions have played some role in reducing poverty in six regions and around the 
world. The main focus of this study is to find out the determinants of outreach in 
microfinance industry. The study explores the dimension of outreach depth or breath of 
outreach, cost of outreach and expected future outreach that are more meaningful in 
alleviating poverty. The impact of institutions specific factors like cost, profitability, and 
MFI age, MFI size, lending methodology, regulation and risk on the outreach of MFIs are 
investigated. The country specific factors such as economic conditions of the country and 
regional dummies are also included to examine their impact on outreach in six regions of 
the world.  
The study contributes to the existing literature by investigating depth, breath and 
cost of outreach of MFIs in reducing poverty, increasing empowerment opportunities and 
maintains sustainability in microfinance institutions. It also highlights that the tradeoff is 
required by MFIs in outreach and sustainability in order to perform microfinance 
activities for a longer period of time. Since the cost of outreach is higher that demands an 
optimal level of profitability that can be generated through efficient management of MFIs 
through cost reducing on regular basis. This study also signifies that age, size, regulation, 
lending methodology, legal status and geographic location of MFIs, human development 
index and population density to capture country specific factors also affect their outreach. 
After brief introduction the remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 
two reviews the relevant literature on the role of microfinance on poverty alleviation. 
Methodology and data used in the analysis is discussed in section three. The empirical 
results and their interpretation are provided in section four and last section offers 
conclusion. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large number of studies on the impact of microfinance in poverty reduction has 
been conducted especially in developing countries in past few years with the growth of 
microfinance institutions in these countries. There is wide range of evidence that suggests 
that microfinance increase income, increase business profits and lift the people out of 
poverty. In contrast there are studies which supports the contrast view that microfinance 
 
3UN has declared 2005 to be the international Year of Microcredit and Mohammad Yunus has received 
the Nobel Peace prize in 2006. 
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programs are successful in reducing poverty in few regions like Asia and Latin America 
but not in every region. This section provides the brief review of the most relevant studies 
done in this area. 
Olivares and Polance (2005) have analysed average outstanding loans used as 
proxy for depth of outreach, as dependent variable with other explanatory variables like 
age of institution, lending methodology, sustainability, competition, and gender. Their 
results reported negative relationship between age and loan size which means that older 
MFIs give loan of small sizes. Another study conducted by Mersland and Strom (2009) 
document that average loan size is a main proxy of serving the poorest of the society. 
They find a positive relationship between average profit and average loan size indicating 
that the increase size of loan represent increase urge for profit by MFIs. Christen and 
Drake (2002) show a positive relationship between depth outreach measured by average 
loan size with profitability. Their study empirically support that MFIs in Latin America 
are most profitable, as their profitability is the mixture of three properties; large loan size, 
competition and regulations.  
Wagenaar (2012) has worked on institutional transformation and mission drift in 
microfinance institutions. According to him, there is huge pressure from donors on 
microfinance institutions to be profitable. Due to this reason some MFIs have 
transformed from non-profit to profit oriented institutions. He argues that financial 
sustainability may lead toward less reaching to the poorest of the poor. Results show that 
transformed MFIs have significantly higher loan size and have lower percentage of 
female borrowers. This shows that transformation effects outreach that cause deviation 
from social mission towards profitability. Cull, et al. (2011) investigate regulated and 
non-regulated microfinance institutions. The results show that regulated MFI has high 
loan size than non-regulated NGO type microfinance institutions. The operating cost 
increases as loan size decreases by lending to poorer segment. To minimise or absorb this 
operating cost MFI are more tempted towards better off clients and restrict outreach to 
poorer segment and increases loan size is reported. Therefore, regulated microfinance 
institutions are more likely to experience deviation from social mission than non-
regulated NGO type institutions. 
Rashid, et al. (2011) find positive impact of microfinance on poverty alleviation. 
They show that increased fund, lower interest rate and accessible financial services made 
microfinance important and effective for poverty reduction. Another study of Zacharias 
(2008) shows that average cost and efficiency goes in opposite direction. He has 
addressed the issue of economics of scale in microfinance institutions and finds evidence 
of scale efficiencies. His study focuses on the operational cost and size relationship finds 
that bigger firm is associated with smaller cost. The study finds that average loan size and 
average cost are negatively co-related thus suggesting that increase in average loan and 
firm size reduces the operational cost.  
Robert, et al. (2011) examine the tradeoff between outreach and efficiency of 
MFIs. They find that MFIs operating in countries with good financial development are 
more efficient. They find that outreach is negatively related with efficiency suggesting 
that MFIs with small loan size are less efficient. Their findings showed that efficiency 
can only be obtained when MFI will focus less on poor segment. 
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Cull, et al. (2007) find not a significant relationship between loan size and 
profitability. For individual lender results reveal that higher profit leads towards lower 
outreach resulting in crowding out the poorer clients. Village micro banks put more focus 
on advancing small loans to the very poor and bear high average cost and receive more 
subsidies. Few individual lending institutions strive best for both profitability and higher 
outreach to the poor; fulfilling their ultimate promises, but these are exceptional cases. 
Finally their results showed that MFIs with higher profits lead toward weak level of 
outreach and kicks out the very poor from financial schemes. 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2009) empirical work on Latin America and south Asia show 
that poverty oriented MFIs may not serving poor neither because of progressive lending nor 
because of cross subsidisation. It is not only the result of transaction cost but also due to their 
own mission fulfilling strategy and other region specific characteristics. According to their 
findings if all loans are identical then transaction cost only affects the number of loans not the 
size of loan. Secondly if there are two types of clients, poor and unbanked wealthier clients, 
having different transaction cost then mission drift on the loyalty of MFIs with outreach 
maximisation objective. Finally MFIs may use unbanked wealthier clients for purpose of 
cross subsidisation for poor showing strong commitment with outreach. 
Ghosh and Tassel (2008) observe that MFIs may drift from their mission and start 
focusing on profitable less costly borrowers in order to attract more profit oriented 
investors.  Their results show that funded by profit oriented donors charge higher interest 
rates. According to their findings poverty gap ratio is the reason for not reaching the 
poor. Higher interest rates are mainly due to very heavy transaction cost that arises when 
lending small amounts to poor people is observed by Gonzalez (2010). He further states 
that Microfinance interest rates normally range between 20 to 70 percent per year, 
depending on the nature of the activity, however they can touch very high level, as high 
as 90 percent per year. Strom and Mersland (2007) find no significance difference 
between nonprofit organisation and shareholder owned MFIs in terms of financial 
performance and outreach. They do not find any evidence that shareholder owned firm 
produces more better results in terms of outreach or profitability than nonprofit 
organisations. So their study clearly indicates that it is MFIs own vision and mission that 
make MFI good or bad at becoming profit orienting or setting maximum outreach as 
basic objective. They find that group lending is expensive but results in maximum 
outreach; on the other hand individual lending is better for financial sustainability. In 
defining the sustainability of MFIs the role of interest rates cannot be under‐valued. 
Fernando (2006) shows that the Human Development Index (HDI) is a measure that 
ranks countries on the basis of human development. It has four levels ranging from "very 
high, "high, "medium", and "low, human development countries. This Index relatively 
measures of education, literacy, standards of living and life expectancy for countries 
worldwide. According to Kai (2009) for measuring the impact of economies of scale, 
another explanatory variable population density has been introduced, the higher value of the 
index shows, more population concentration. The value can range from 0 (the population 
would be equally scattered all over county or region) to 100 (all population would be 
concentrated in one area of the country or region) considering the effect of economies of 
scale, a higher value of index may lead to reduce the operational costs, thus increasing 
productivity. Add a line about the findings of HDI and PDP in two studies. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The poverty is reduced by reaching the poor and long term serving the poor that is 
possible when MFIs’ are financially sustainable, therefore both outreach and financial 
suitability is investigated in this study. 
 
3.1.  Methodological Framework  
The main focus of this study is to examine that microfinance institutions are 
playing their role to reduce poverty. The microfinance institutions objectives include; 
outreach to the poor and institutional financial sustainability that is long run expected 
outreach to cut poverty [Zeller, et al. (2002) Schreiner (2002)]. The different dimensions 
of outreach are discussed in the literature Schreiner (2002) and followed by several 
studies investigating outreach and financial sustainability Mersland and Strom (2008); 
Woller (2006); Woller and Schreiner (2002) and many recent studies and used by 
performance evaluation and impact assessment studies by donors like USAID [Mersland 
and Strom (2008)]. 
The breadth of outreach indicates the number of poor participate in microfinance 
program.
4
 It is expected that the larger the number of borrowers the better the outreach 
and more the poorest population is served. The number of active borrowers is used to 
capture breadth of outreach in the present study. The depth of outreach captures the value 
of net gain of a borrower as a client of MFI programme and it is based on the argument 
that outreach must be measured not just by total number of borrowers but on the number 
of poor borrowers,
5
 as their relative level of poverty is also considered. The average loan 
size has been used as a proxy measure of breadth of outreach and smaller loans indicate 
poorer borrowers are served, all other things being equal.
6
 The average loan size captures 
the depth of outreach in the present study following Schreiner (2001) and others.  
The cost of outreach to an MFI client refers to interest rate paid and other related 
costs as a result of receiving financial services from MFIs. The cost of outreach is the 
highest amount the borrower would agree to bear to get the loan [Navajas, et al. (2000)]. 
Therefore, all things being equal, the less the cost of outreach the more clients are willing 
to borrow. Interest charges are used as a measure of cost to clients [Mersland and Strom 
(2008) and others].  
The Financial sustainability is the ability of MFI to cover all its operating and 
financing costs from revenue mostly from the return of loans portfolio [Tellis and 
Seymour (2002) and Thapa, et al. (1992)]. The amount of return will depend on the 
interest rates charged and the volume of loan outstanding which in turn depend on 
average loan and the number of loans remaining outstanding. This would mean that, all 
things being equal, the more clients MFIs have that take loans, at the same or higher 
interest rates the higher the revenue. On the other side the higher the cost incurred to 
serving its clients would mean a reduced profitability to an MFI. This implies that in 
order to achieve sustainability, the MFIs that target poorer borrowers must charge higher 
 
4Studies have used the number of borrowers as measures of microfinance breadth of outreach 
[Mersland and Strom (2008, 2009); Hermes, et al. (2008) and others]. 
5Navajas, et al, (2000);  Hulme and Mosley (1996) and many recent work.  
6Mersland and Strom (2009); Cull, et al. (2007), Adongo and Stork (2006); Hartarska (2005); Woller 
and Schreiner (2002) and Schreiner (2001). 
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interest rates [Conning (1999)]. Charging higher interest rates, which could lead to 
profitability, may however, price the poorest out of the microfinance services and thereby 
adversely affecting the attainment of the social objective of the MFIs [Morduch (2000)].  
Most participants in the informal sector are believed to be women [Liedholm and 
Mead, (1995)].  Although female are about 50 percent of the world’s work force, and 
contribute about 67 percent of the world’s work, but only 10 percent of the world’s wages 
are earned by them and belong 1 percent of its wealth. Most female are doing same work 
as male do, but females face more poverty within the household than male, but their work 
is mostly not visible nor paid [Fernando (2006b)]. It is believed that providing credit to 
the women by MFIs will reduce the poverty of the household.  
The following models are estimated to examine the effect of MFI specific factors 
and country specific factors on the number of active borrows and average loan size. The 
number of active borrowers indicator of breadth of outreach is adopted by Armendariz, et 
al. (2011) and other studies. Average loan size is also widely.  
In Equation (1) AB is the number of active borrowers which measures the breadth 
if outreach
7
 and it is related with the capital structure, average profit, average cost, size of 
MFI, age of MFI, portfolio at risk. A set of dummy variables include: group lending will 
take 1 and zero for individual lending, NGO is 1 and zero if MFI has other legal status, 
operates in rural market take 1 and zero for urban market, regulated take 1 and 
unregulated zero. To measure country specific difference Human Development Index 
(HDI) and Population Density per square meter (PDP) are used. HDI is a measure that 
ranks countries on the basis of human development. It has four levels ranging from "very 
high, "high, "medium", and "low, human development countries. This Index relatively 
measures of education, literacy, standards of living and life expectancy for countries 
worldwide. For measuring the impact of economies of scale, another explanatory variable 
population density has been introduced, the higher value of the index shows, more 
population concentration. The value can range from 0 (the population would be equally 
scattered all over county or region) to 100 (all population would be concentrated in one 
area of the country or region) considering the effect of economies of scale, a higher value 
of index may lead to reduce the operational cost. 
Due to interdependence of number of active borrowers, average loan size, interest rate 
and financial sustainability, these four models are estimated simultaneously given below: 
ititititititittit AgeFSSCapRiskSizeCostofitAB 7654320 Pr   
ititititititit PDHDIgNgoGroupRural  1312111098 Re  (4.1) 
ititititititittit AgeFSSCapRiskSizeIntofitALS 7654320 Pr 
 
ititititititit PDHDIgNgoGroupRural  1312111098 Re  (4.2)
 
ititititititittit AgeFSSCapRiskSizeALSofitInt 7654320 Pr 
 
ititititititit PDHDIgNgoGroupRural  1312111098 Re  (4.3)
 
ititititititittit AgeALSCapRiskSizeCostofitFSS 7654320 Pr 
 
ititititititit PDHDIgNgoGroupRural  1312111098 Re  (4.4) 
 
7As indicator of breadth of outreach is adopted by Armendariz, et al. (2011) and other studies. 
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The six regions are expected to be different in depth of outreach, its breadth, 
women outreach, cost of outreach and financial sustainability as indicator of future 
outreach. Therefore all four models reported above are estimated by including regional 
dummies. Among the six regions: Eastern Europe and central Asia. South Africa, South 
Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Middle East and north 
Africa, the Eastern Europe and central Asia is taken as base category.  
As this study uses the information for 382 microfinance institutions belonging to 
six regions over the period for the period 2006 to 2012, the panel data estimation 
technique is suitable for this purpose. Empirical researches on possibly encounter two 
sources of discrepancies, missing variables and endogeneity biases and these models have 
simultaneity as well. The generalised method of moment GMM estimator is more 
suitable as it deals with the problems. The generalised method of the moment model 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and modified by Blunder and Bond (1998) 
is used as the estimation technique. The lag explanatory variables are used as 
instruments and the Sargen test is used to test the validity of the instrumental 
variables.  
 
3.2.  Data 
The data has been collected for 382 Micro finance institutions, located in 70 
countries throughout the six regions of the world including: The six regions Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, South Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, and Middle East and North Africa. The data is on annual basis 
covering the period 2006 to 2013. The data is from Microfinance Information Exchange 
(Mix) which is an authentic source providing uniform data all over the world.  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The effect of microfinance institution specific and country specific factors that 
influence outreach to the poor and being financial sustainability that is expected outreach 
of these instructions in the long run to cut poverty. The panel data is used and generalised 
method of Moments of Blunder and Bond (1998) is applied as estimation technique. 
The analysis begins with the distribution of MFIs among different regions, type, 
regulated or unregulated and on the country level are presented in Table A1, A2, A3 and 
A4 in Appendix respectively. 
The results of factors determining the breadth of outreach are reported in Table 4. 
1.  The cost per borrower has negative and significant effect on total number of active 
borrowers in almost all regions and worldwide. Therefore, as cost increases MFIs serve 
less borrowers by giving larger loans to fewer clients. This is also consist with the Yunus 
(1999) observation that increasing cost may reduce micro loans to the core poor clients. 
The results also confirm by other studies including Mersland and Strom (2009). The age 
of an MFI has positive impact on number of active borrowers which is significant for 
almost all regions and also collectively indicating mature firm have more active clients. 
The large sized of MFI serve more active borrowers in all regions and collectively. The 
risk of repayment is inversely related to breadth of outreach but significant in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and in world. Regulated firm have less clients but negative 
relationship is significant in South Asia, Latin America and in all regions together. Group 
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lending relative to individual has positive effect in Africa, Latin America and worldwide 
showing that group lending increase the breadth of outreach When MFIs operate in rural 
markets the number of client increases and this increase is significant in Eastern Europe, 
Africa, Latin America and overall in six regions. Capital structure has no impact on the 
breadth of outreach. Increase in human development, population density also increases 
client served but this relationship is significant in South Asia and worldwide. The results 
show that financial sustainability is positively and significantly related with the total 
number of active borrowers in South Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe and overall 
regions. This means as increase in the number of borrows increase sustainability. The 
result is also in line with the results of Logotri (2006) but in contrast with Marsland and 
Storm (2008).  
The results reported in Table 4.2 are the factors that affect depth of outreach 
measured by average loan size. The result shows that an MFI is able to earn higher profit 
when loan size is larger. This is in conformity with Yunus (1999) argument that big loan 
size creates more profit and this thing crowd out the poorer clients from credit scheme 
[Christen and Drake (2002)]. The loan size increases with increase in cost significantly in 
Latin America and worldwide, MFIs are needed to increase efficiency to minimize cost 
and to avoid mission drift. When an MFI is efficient, its cost is low and loan size is also 
small. This result is also in line with the cost findings of Mersland and Strom (2011), 
Freixas and Rochet (2008). The results indicate that average loan size increases as size of 
the MFI increases in all regions. This result is supported by Mersland and Strom (2011). 
MFI maturity has positive impact on loan size and significant for South Asia, Middle 
East, Latin America and worldwide. The results show that financial sustainability has 
positive and significant effect on average loan size. As average profit increases loan size 
also increases and as average profit decreases average loan size also decreases. The result 
is consistent with the findings of Mersland and Strom (2011) and Freixas and Rochet 
(2008) model. 
 
Table 4.1 
Results of Determinants of Breadth of Outreach Measured by  
Number of Active Borrowers 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
& central Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa South Africa South Asia 
Latin America 
& Caribbean All world 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
C 3.40 1.37 -3.62* -9.14 7.49 8.73 7.30* 8.46 -2.14* -1.81 -3.75* -9.59 1.38* 6.27 
AGE 0.06* 2.45 0.01 0.40 0.05* 2.02 0.06* 2.35 0.02** 1.74 0.01 0.47 0.02* 4.95 
CAP 0.14 0.24 0.19 1.33 0.51 1.03 0.73 1.50 0.34* 3.31 0.19 1.35 0.55* 7.49 
GROUP -1.42* -3.16 0.12* 2.26 -0.19* -2.96 -0.23* -3.02 -0.30 -1.48 0.12* 2.29 0.40* 7.41 
REG -0.01* -1.87 -0.18* -2.94 -0.09 -0.27 0.17 0.56 0.30*** 1.77 -0.19* -3.03 -0.03*** -1.76 
NGO 0.03 1.35 0.14*** 1.76 0.03** 1.77 0.17** 1.71 0.21* 2.11 0.09* 3.11 0.18* 3.14 
RISK -0.51 -1.37 -0.67* -5.28 -0.69 -1.21 -0.40 -1.03 -0.16 -0.61 -0.64* -5.24 -0.18* -4.21 
FSS -0.21 -0.90 0.81* 4.58 -0.97 -0.82 -0.50 -0.62 0.50* 1.84 0.18* 4.59 0.61* 2.55 
SIZE 0.22* 5.45 0.77* 4.86 0.22* 5.41 0.21* 5.16 0.60* 17.34 0.77* 5.02 0.55* 8.26 
Cost 0.96* 3.14 0.51* 3.85 0.32* 3.41 0.19* 2.77 0.08* 2.94 0.51* 3.92 0.73* 5.00 
Rural 0.29 0.93 0.37* 6.65 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.39 0.70 0.37* 6.67 0.42* 6.81 
Profit -0.69* -2.21 0.35* 8.14 -0.42* -1.97 -0.79* -1.98 -0.23 -1.25 0.32* 7.88 -0.05 -0.44 
HDI 6.65*** 1.71 0.04 0.12 0.67 0.69 0.47 0.48 0.64* 2.87 0.22 0.62 2.02* 11.41 
PDP 0.01 1.29 0.02 -0.19 0.01 1.28 0.01 1.40 0.01* 3.27 0.01 0.26 0.02* 7.21 
R
2
 0.48  0.46  0-50  0.49  0.45  0.40  0.49  
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 4.2 
Results of Determinants of Depth of Outreach Measured by Average loan size 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
& central Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa South Africa South Asia 
Latin America 
& Caribbean All world 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
C -1.77 -1.60 1.18 2.29 0.52 3.87* 0.11 0.30 -0.18 -0.32 2.56* 10.95 0.41* 4.65 
AGE 0.02 1.15 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -2.91* 0.04 3.17* 0.01 0.86 0.01* 2.26 0.01* 3.26 
CAP -0.76* -2.54 0.23 0.98 -0.15 -1.56 0.11 0.46 -0.07 -0.33 -0.39* -3.25 0.09* 1.90 
GROUP 0.06 0.21 0.15* 1.90 0.23 2.96* -0.14 -0.67 -0.25* -2.56 -0.11* -2.46 -0.11* -3.33 
REG -0.38** -1.73 0.03 0.37 0.08 1.39 0.24 1.59 0.09 1.15 0.15* 3.04 0.22* 6.60 
NGO -0.03*** -1.75 -0.02** -1.84 -0.33 -0.831 -0.19* 2.46 -0.02** -1.79 -0.05* 2.75 0.16* 2.44 
RISK -0.28 -0.13 -0.39 -0.50 0.05 0.07 -1.40 -0.68 0.53 0.50 0.77* 3.74 0.42* 2.37 
FSS -0.02 -0.01 1.34** 1.83 0.17 0.36 -1.45 -1.14 -0.07 -0.16 -0.99* -2.68 -0.07 -0.45 
SIZE 0.09* 5.02 0.01 1.07 0.02 2.82* 0.01 0.94 0.01 1.58 0.05* 12.15 0.05* 16.70 
INT -0.82* -5.25 0.07 0.39 -0.03 -0.18 -0.06 -0.13 -0.41 -1.20 -0.12 -1.10 -0.17* -1.98 
Rural -0.34* -1.93 -0.06 -0.66 -0.26 -3.61* -0.20 -1.06 -0.16 -0.90 -0.10* -2.05 -0.14* -3.65 
Profit 0.88 1.30 -0.44 -1.52 -0.17 -0.73 -0.39 -0.63 -0.01 -0.09 -0.59* -3.86 -0.29* -3.71 
HDI 1.92 1.01 -0.81 -1.12 -0.17 -0.96 0.38 0.80 0.88 0.79 -3.82* -11.84 -0.72* -6.80 
PDP 0.01* 3.71 0.02* -2.59 0.00 -5.15* 0.00 -1.22 0.01 -1.11 0.02* -6.40 0.01* -5.12 
R
2
 0.43  0.44  0.38  0.35  0.35  0.32  0.39  
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent. 
 
The cost of outreach to an MFI borrowers is captured by real interest rate paid and 
other related costs as a result of receiving financial services from an MFI. The real 
interest has two sided affects; interest rate provides financial support and income to the 
MFI and on the other hand it increases cost of a loan facility to the poor. It inhibits the 
poor from accessing financial services. There is a relation between cost and interest rate. 
It is expected that increasing cost will increase the interest rate in order to cover the cost 
and be financially sustainable on the one hand [Dlamini (2012)]. On the other hand, the 
less the cost of outreach the more borrowers are willing to get loan from the microfinance 
and smaller are loan size other things being equal. [Mersland and Strom (2008)]. The 
results of determinants of interest rate that is measure of cost of outreach are displayed in 
Table 4.3. The results show that in all six regions and worldwide average loan size is 
inversely related with interest rate. Higher cost leads to less reaching the poor. 
Sustainability is positively related to interest rate. Size of MFI does not affect the interest 
rate in all regions but in all regions together it has small but positive and significant effect 
on interest rate. Risk of repayments negatively impact interest rate except Eastern 
Europe. Capital structure, group lending compared to individual, rural market compared 
to urban and regulation are not significant contributors of cost of outreach. PDP and HDI 
have no role on the interest rate charged from borrowers.  
In Table 4.4 presents the results of factors contributing to financial sustainability. 
The results indicate that the cost per borrower reduces the financial sustainability of the 
MFIs as suggested by the accounting theory that costs reduce profitability. This result is 
also supported by Conning (1999) that MFIs with higher costs per dollar loaned are less 
profitable and therefore, less financially sustainable. As the case of type of lending group 
lending has positive effect on sustainability and this is supported by the theory that MFI 
prefers group lending that ensures repayment and increase financial sustainability. This 
finding is in line with Hartarska (2005); Mersland and Strom (2009); Armendariz and 
Morduch (2007); Cull, et al. (2007). It is expected that mature MFIs to be more 
sustainable than younger ones, but results indicate that the age of an MFI is not related to 
its financial sustainability.  The  results  show positive relationship between MFI size and  
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Table 4.3 
Results of Determination of Interest Rate as Measure of Cost of Outreach 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
& central Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa South Africa South Asia 
Latin America 
& Caribbean All world 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
C -0.39* -2.38 0.33* 2.73 -0.02 -0.31 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.32 0.32* 4.77 0.13* 6.46 
AGE 0.01* 3.67 0.01 -1.23 0.01* 2.63 0.01* 2.56 0.01 -0.79 0.01* -2.28 0.01 -1.12 
CAP -0.07 -1.59 0.07 1.29 -0.08** -1.87 -0.08** -1.86 -0.12* -3.37 0.03 0.76 -0.01 -0.45 
GROUP -0.05 -1.26 -0.02 -1.25 0.01 0.24 -0.01 -0.37 -0.02 -1.15 -0.01 -0.68 -0.01 -1.13 
REG -0.01 -0.24 0.01 0.31 0.08* 2.88 0.08* 2.72 0.02 1.34 -0.01 -0.69 -0.01** -1.77 
NGO 0.02** 1.77 0.13* 2.73 0.04** 1.85 0.01*** !.75 0.04* 1.92 0.20* 1.97 0.13* 2.56 
RISK 0.74* 2.30 -0.28 -1.49 0.99* 2.70 0.93* 2.55 -0.10 -0.56 -0.24** -1.82 -0.05 -1.28 
FSS 0.18 0.88 0.33** 1.89 0.34 1.46 0.03* 2.00 0.10 1.40 0.21* 2.03 0.14* 3.98 
SIZE 0.01* 1.35 0.02 -0.81 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.51 0.02 1.43 0.01 0.95 0.01* 3.93 
ALS -0.06* -5.25 -0.01* -2.39 -0.01 -1.78*** -0.01 -0.28 -0.01 -2.20 -0.01 -1.80** -0.01* -1.98 
Rural -0.01 -0.48 0.02 0.73 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.29 -0.01 -0.38 0.01 0.68 0.03* 3.38 
Cost 0.71* 8.87 0.26* 3.85 0.83* 9.71 0.84 9.77 0.02 1.17 0.07 1.66 0.01* 5.24 
HDI 0.49** 1.82 -0.20 -1.18 -0.10 -1.14 -0.10 -1.11 0.11 0.63 -0.19 -1.97 0.03 1.13 
PDPSM 0.02* 4.37 0.01 -1.60 0.01 -0.98 0.01 -1.08 0.02** 1.88 0.02 -1.31 0.02* -3.47 
R
2
 0.68  0.54  0.59  0.59  0.55   0.54  0.55 
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent.  
 
Table 4.4 
Results of Determination of Financial Sustainability as Measure of  
Future Expectation of Outreach 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
& central Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa South Africa South Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean All world 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
C -4.25 -1.50 -0.12 -0.62 -0.31 -0.49 -0.41 -0.66 0.87* 3.00 0.28* 2.49 0.30 3.48 
AGE 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.79 0.02 -0.18 0.01 0.30 0.02 -0.96 0.01 -0.96 0.01* -2.83 
CAP 0.20* 3.58 0.10 1.13 1.23 2.89 0.32* 3.09 0.31* 2.71 0.12* 2.20 0.25* 8.76 
GROUP -0.20* 2.47 0.04* 2.15 0.06*** 1.77 0.01 1.83** 0.04* 2.78 0.05* 2.48 0.02* 2.16 
ALS 0.30* 1.90 0.05* 2.28 0.10*** 1.73 -0.09 -0.59 -0.02 -0.53 -0.04* -3.16 -0.08* -2.32 
REG 0.29 0.64 -0.10* -0.32 0.08 2.11 0.21 0.81 -0.06 -1.54 -0.07* -3.02 -0.04* -2.04 
NGO 0.06 0.28 0.09 0.55 0.03 0.32 0.19* 2.49 0.01** 1.85 0.04 0.38 0.10** 1.87 
RISK -3.29 -0.94 -0.18 -0.66 -1.55 -0.44 -1.49 -0.42 -1.05 -1.54 0.13 0.59 -0.36* -3.36 
SIZE 0.09* 1.99 0.06* 2.11 0.04 1.44 0.03 1.27 0.06* 11.92 0.01* 7.09 0.05* 7.91 
AB -0.29* -3.16 0.27* 4.09 0.80* 2.15 0.77* 2.16 0.20* 2.93 0.31* 7.05 0.01 0.83 
INT -0.19 -1.21 -0.07 -0.95 -1.16** -1.84 -0.90 -1.05 -0.14 -0.85 -0.08 -1.53 0.01 0.22 
Rural -0.54* -1.91 0.03 0.86 -0.24 -0.75 -0.34 -1.03 0.06 0.68 -0.03 -1.22 -0.04 -1.53 
Cost -0.17 -1.50 0.28* 2.39 -0.15* -2.10 -0.57 -0.54 -0.22* -5.23 0.10 1.34 0.16 1.98 
HDI 11.81* 2.58 0.18 0.69 0.22 0.27 0.36 0.44 -1.58* -2.84 -0.29** -1.88 0.05 0.04 
PD 0.01* 2.51 0.01 -0.11 0.03 0.71 0.01 0.51 0.02 -0.39 0.01* -1.99 0.02*** 1.72 
R
2
 0.42  0.45  0.49  0.40  0.42  0.47  0.47  
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent. 
 
their financial sustainability that is contradiction with findings by Hartarska (2005), but 
in confirmation with Mersland and Strom (2009); Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008); 
Cull, et al. (2007). The number of active borrowers which measures the breadth of 
outreach improves the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions that is 
consistent with the results of Logotri (2006). The repayment risk decreases the financially 
sustainable as expected. The rural market participation has no role of financial 
sustainability. The financial sustainability is positively related to interest rate and 
negatively to average loan size. The MFI size and experience makes MFI more 
financially sustainable. The capital structure, rural market, group lending are positive 
contributors indicating that in most of the regions and around the world financial 
sustainability and outreach has trade off.  
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This goal of microfinance to reach and empower women as majority of the world’s 
poor is women and work in informal sector. It is believed that providing credit to women 
would reduce the poverty level of the household. The results show that group lending, 
rural market, capital structure, risk and financial sustainability, MFI size, population 
density have positive impact on women outreach. Age has no effect on reaching the 
women and has effect on all regions together. Regulated MFI target not to the poorest 
section as collateral is required, therefore these MFIs have less women client and HDI 
has positive effect. The results lead to conclusion that in case of women financial 
sustainability and outreach are met simultaneously to some extent. 
The results of different measures of outreach are estimated by using regional 
dummies along with other determinants. The results show the fact that the smaller is the 
size of loan, the higher is the interest charged on these loans. According to Cull, et al. 
(2007) a simple indicator is average loan size showing that the small size of loans 
symbolise that MFI is targeting poor customers and help in declining poverty [Cutler 
(2010) and Rosenberg, et al. (2009)].The variable for breadth outreach by number of 
active borrowers and women borrowers has also shown significant positive impact on 
poverty reduction [Hermes, et al. (2009)]. As regard result of lending type shows that 
those MFIs who mostly lend to group compared to individual generally charge 
significantly low rates of interest so the cost of outreach is higher [Cull, et al. (2008)] 
showing that group lending increase outreach and reduce poverty. The results of control 
variables are almost same as obtained in above tables. The MFIs who are operating in 
South Africa, South Asia, East Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Middle East and North Africa have less financial suitability but more active borrowers, 
women borrowers, average loan size, charging relatively high interest rates as compared 
to Eastern Europe and Central Asia MFIs with exception of South Asia that is charging 
lower rate.    
 
Table 4.5 
Results of Determination of Women Outreach 
  
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Eastern Europe 
& central Asia 
Middle East & 
North Africa South Africa South Asia 
Latin America 
& Caribbean All world 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
C 0.32 1.14 0.17* 2.40 0.53* 3.42 0.53* 3.45 0.39 1.62 0.14* 1.92 0.10* 3.13 
AGE 0.01 0.67 0.01* 3.66 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.18 -0.01* -5.52 0.03* 3.68 0.01 0.06 
CAP 0.04 0.34 0.18* 4.77 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.11 0.52* 5.91 0.17* 4.73 0.04* 2.02 
GROUP 0.03* 2.32 0.04* 3.29 0.13** 1.81 0.13 2.41 0.01* 2.22 0.05* 3.33 0.13* 10.63 
REG 0.06 0.76 0.10 0.65 0.04 0.76 0.05 0.86 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.66 0.16*8 1.80 
NGO 0.07* 2.35 0.01* 1.99 0.04** 1.86 0.48* 2.35 0.02** 1.78 0.12*** 1.73 0.21* 2.37 
RISK -0.35** -0.81 -0.20** -1.85 -0.56 -1.62 -0.79*** -1.66 -0.39*** -1.69 -0.20** -1.84 -0.35* -5.17 
FSS 0.88*** 1.61 0.69* 6.05 0.82*** 1.69 0.81*** 1.67 0.14** 1.77 0.69* 6.02 0.74* 12.51 
SIZE 0.02* 2.50 0.02* 13.43 0.02* 3.01 0.02* 3.26 0.06 4.74 0.02* 13.55 0.02* 20.70 
Profit 0.56* 2.66 0.02 0.69 0.45* 2.13 0.52* 3.27 0.07 1.28 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.04 
Rural -0.21 3.01 0.11* 7.68 0.16** 1.88 0.16* 1.90 0.01 0.13 0.11* 7.67 0.09* 6.55 
Cost -0.04 -0.15 0.72* 5.24 0.13 0.49 0.32* 1.98 0.07** 1.83 0.72* 15.08 0.36* 12.14 
HDI 0.80 3.91 0.27* 2.78 0.13 0.64 0.13** 1.72 0.54** 1.79 0.23* 2.30 0.22* 5.33 
PDP 0.01 -1.11 0.02 -0.40 0.01 -0.62 0.01 -0.57 0.01* 3.28 0.01 0.08 0.01* 6.05 
R
2
 0.34  0.35  0.36  0.35  0.32  0.37  0.38  
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 4.6 
 Results of Regional Differences in outreach 
 Interest Rate Average Loan Size Active Borrowers Women Borrower 
Financial 
Sustainability 
  Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
C 0.15 10.20 0.09 1.34 -0.39** -1.82 -0.06 -1.66 0.41* 4.41 
AGE 0.01*** -1.73 0.01* 2.96 0.01* 3.46 0.01* -1.94 0.02** 1.80 
CAP -0.02 -1.40 0.02 0.40 0.30* 4.44 0.12* 6.41 0.22* 7.47 
GROUP 0.01*** 1.63 -0.12* -3.76 0.15* 3.00 0.11* 8.90 0.01 0.69 
REG -0.01 -1.04 0.21* 6.08 -0.18* -2.70 -0.03* -2.50 0.01** 1.78 
NGO 0.07* 2.32 -0.02** -1.75 0.03** 1.79 0.02* 11.72 0.05** 1.76 
RISK -0.07** -1.88 -0.28*** -1.63 -1.16* -4.70 -0.37* -5.50 -0.09 -3.79 
SIZE 0.01* 4.28 0.04* 14.36 0.54* 5.46 0.03* 5.50 0.29* 2.69 
Avgls -0.01* -2.78       0.05* 7.47 
INT   -0.24* -2.78 0.36* 6.38 0.12* 8.26 0.01* 1.34 
Rural 0.03* 2.86 -0.18* -4.70 0.03* 2.86 0.12* 8.26 -0.04 -0.69 
Profit 0.07* 4.00 0.40* 5.58 0.83* 4.09 0.58* 10.23 0.01* 2.26 
HDI 0.03*** 1.73 0.72* 6.80 0.01 2.05 0.06** 1.81 0.08** 1.85 
PD 0.02* 3.47 0.01* 5.12 0.01* 2.93 0.01* 2.50 0.01 0.33 
DAF 0.02 0.23 0.17* 3.13 1.33* 13.90 0.09* 3.59 -0.17 -3.99 
DEAP 0.04* 2.46 -0.05 -0.72 1.71* 15.67 0.24* 8.18 0.10 1.98 
DLAC 0.02*** 1.78 -0.11* -2.37 0.55* 7.84 0.05* 2.67 -0.18 -5.50 
DMENA 0.04* 2.67 -0.33* -4.48 1.29* 12.51 0.13* 4.72 -0.13 -2.71 
DSA -0.08* -6.14 -0.46* -8.20 2.15* 23.26 0.34* 14.31 -0.17 -3.82 
  0.52  0.50  0.51  0.53  0.54   
Note: The * indicates significance at 1 percent, ** significance at 5 percent and *** significance at 10 percent. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of this study is to examine that microfinance institutions are 
playing their role to reduce poverty. The poverty is reduced by reaching the poor and 
long term serving the poor that is possible when MFIs’ are financially sustainable, 
therefore both outreach and financial suitability is investigated in this study by 
conducting a cross region analysis of 382 MFIs covering six regions of the world. In this 
study two approaches are used for estimations, conducting estimations for four measures 
of outreach (breadth, depth, cost, and expected future outreach) for each of the region 
separately and for the world as a whole, first. Second for robustness check the results of 
different measures of outreach are estimated by using regional dummies along with other 
determinants. 
The results show the fact that the smaller is the size of loan, the higher is the 
interest charged on these loans. According to Cull, et al. (2007) a simple indicator is 
average loan size showing that the small size of loans symbolize that MFI is targeting 
poor customers and help in declining poverty. The reason is that well off customers are 
not attracted in small loans and in line with the results of Cutler (2010) and Rosenberg, et 
al. (2009). The variable for breadth outreach by number of active borrowers and women 
borrowers has also shown significant positive impact on poverty reduction [Hermes, et al. 
(2009)]. As regard result of lending type shows that those MFIs who mostly lend to group 
compared to individual generally charge significantly low rates of interest so the cost of 
outreach is higher Cull, et al. (2008) showing that group lending increase outreach and 
reduce poverty. MFIs lending type group lending have low rate and no collateral compare 
to individual, who on average charge lower cost of outreach (interest rates). Nonprofit 
institutes are more actively meeting the objective of reaching poor and taking participants 
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out of poverty The results of other factors like MFI size, capital structure, MFI size, profit 
are positive and risk, regulation, are negative and significant contributor of outreach 
generally in all regions. The results support that providing credit to large number of 
active borrowers and women would reduce the poverty level of the household. The 
overall results of the study indicate that as depth of outreach is inversely related with the 
cost of outreach and positively with sustainability. However, breadth of outreach has 
significant positive relation with cost of outreach and sustainability. These results 
indicate that in most of the regions and around the world financial sustainability and 
outreach has trade off. The implications of these results is that it is required both outreach 
and sustainability, as in order to survive in future, microfinance industry should be 
sustainable by reducing its transaction, operational and administrative cost against its 
lending interest rate and average profit.  
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
MFIs on Regional Basis 
S.No. Region Frequency % 
1 East Asia and the pacific 20 5.235 
2 Eastern Europe and central Asia 74 19.372 
3 Middle east and north Africa 22 5.759 
4 South Africa 56 14.660 
5 South Asia 49 12.827 
6 Latin America and the Caribbean 161 42.147 
 Total 382 100 
 
Table A2 
MFIs on the Basis of Legal Status 
S.No. Legal Status Frequency % 
1 Bank 36 9.424084 
2 Credit union/cooperatives 41 10.73298 
3 NBFI 140 36.64921 
4 NGO 165 43.19372 
 Total 382 100 
 
Table A3 
MFIs on the Basis of Lending Type 
S.No. Lending Types 
1 Group lending 
2 Individual lending 
3 Village banking 
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Table A4 
MFI on the Basis of Countries 
S.No. Country 
No.of 
MFIs 
S.No. Country 
No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 36 Kyrgyzstan 5 
2 Angola 1 37 Lebanon 1 
3 Argentina 2 38 Mali 3 
4 Armenia 4 39 Magnolia 1 
5 Azerbaijan 10 40 Morocco 7 
6 Bangladesh 4 41 Mexico 13 
7 Benin 4 42 Moldova  1 
8 Bolivia 24 43 Mongolia 2 
9 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
9 44 Montenegro  1 
10 Brazil 6 45 Mozambique 1 
11 Bulgaria  2 46 Nepal 6 
12 Burkina Faso 1 47 Nicaragua 14 
13 Cameroon 2 48 Nigeria 3 
14 Chile 2 49 West Bank and Gaza 1 
15 Colombia 11 50 Pakistan 4 
16 Cambodia 11 51 Palestine 2 
17 Costa Rica 1 52 Paraguay 4 
18 East Timor 2 53 Peru 38 
19 Ecuador 28 54 Philippines 4 
20 Egypt 6 55 Rwanda 2 
21 El Salvador 3 56 
Republican 
Dominica 
2 
22 Ethiopia 6 57 Russia 7 
23 Gambia 1 58 S Africa 3 
24 Georgia 6 59 Senegal 5 
25 Ghana 3 60 Serbia 2 
26 Guatemala 6 61 Sudan 1 
27 Guinea 1 62 Tajikistan 6 
28 Haiti 2 63 Tanzania 5 
29 Honduras 2 64 Togo 2 
30 India 35 65 Trinidad & Tobago 1 
31 Indonesia 1 66 Tunisia 1 
32 Jordan 3 67 Uganda 4 
33 Kazakhstan  6 68 Uzbekistan 3 
34 Kenya 9 69 Vietnam 2 
35 Kosovo 6 70 Venezuela 1 
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